The rule of reason : the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce / edited by Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster.

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

The essays explore Peirce's work from various perspectives, considering the philosophical significance of his contributions to logic; the foundations of his philosophical system; his metaphysics and cosmology; his theories of inquiry and truth; and his theories of mind, agency, and selfhood.

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CHOICE Review

Peirce (1839-1914) attracts the high-quality, diverse scholarship evidenced in this collection. Douglas Anderson relates Peirce's reservations concerning James and Dewey's experimental, pragmatic politics to Peirce's worry that James and Dewey over-intellectualized political practice and would enslave inquiry to practical ends. Vincent Colapietro illuminates Peirce's semiotics and fallibilism as an attempt to navigate between historicism and transcendentalism; the key is our role as "implicated participants ... in evolved and evolving practices." Susan Haack begins with subtle reflections on Peirce's first rule of reason--"to learn you must desire to learn"--and ends with strong criticisms of professionalism and much contemporary philosophy. Christopher Hookway untangles Peirce's thoughts on sentiment, reason, and self-control. Paul Forster traces Peirce's prescient views on probability in the natural world to his very early thoughts on statistical inference. Turning to logic, Jaakko Hintikka maintains that Peirce (like Boole and L"owenheim) was among logicians a "model theoretician" in contrast with "universalists" like Frege, Russell, and Quine. Isaac Levi also reads Peirce to raise questions about the scope and nature of logic, specifically, the place of induction and abduction. Two technical papers probe Peirce's theory of graphs and quantification. And there is much more. Upper-division undergraduate; graduate; faculty. D. Christie; University of New Hampshire